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ABSTRACT 
A growing number of people are working as part of on-line 
crowd work. Crowd work is often thought to be low wage 
work. However, we know little about the wage distribution 
in practice and what causes low/high earnings in this 
setting. We recorded 2,676 workers performing 3.8 million 
tasks on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Our task-level analysis 
revealed that workers earned a median hourly wage of only 
~$2/h, and only 4% earned more than $7.25/h. While the 
average requester pays more than $11/h, lower-paying 
requesters post much more work. Our wage calculations are 
influenced by how unpaid work is accounted for, e.g., time 
spent searching for tasks, working on tasks that are rejected, 
and working on tasks that are ultimately not submitted. We 
further explore the characteristics of tasks and working 
patterns that yield higher hourly wages. Our analysis 
informs platform design and worker tools to create a more 
positive future for crowd work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Crowd work is growing [31,46]. A report by Harris and 
Krueger states that 600k workers participate in the online 
gig economy and the number is growing rapidly [31]. 
Crowdsourcing does not just enable novel technologies 
(e.g., human-powered word processing and assistive 
technologies [5,6]) that we create in the HCI community, 
but also facilitates new ways of working. Its remote and 
asynchronous work style, unbounded by time and location, 
is considered to extend the modern office work [44,46,47], 
enabling people with disabilities, at-home parents, and 
temporarily out-of-work engineers to work [1,4,39,46,65]. 
Yet, despite the potential for crowdsourcing platforms to 
extend the scope of the labor market, many are concerned 
that workers on crowdsourcing markets are treated unfairly 
[19,38,39,42,47,59]. Concerns about low earnings on crowd 
work platforms have been voiced repeatedly. Past research 
has found evidence that workers typically earn a fraction of 
the U.S. minimum wage [34,35,37–39,49] and many 
workers report not being paid for adequately completed 
tasks [38,51]. This is problematic as income generation is 
the primary motivation of workers [4,13,46,49]. 
Detailed research into crowd work earnings has been 
limited by an absence of adequate quantitative data. Prior 
research based on self-reported income data (e.g., [4,34,49]) 
might be subject to systemic biases [22] and is often not 
sufficiently granular to facilitate a detailed investigation of 
earnings dispersion. Existing data-driven quantitative work 
in crowdsourcing research has taken the employers’ 
perspective [49] (e.g., finding good pricing methods 
[36,50,61], suggesting effective task design for requesters 
[24,40]), or it characterizes crowdsourcing market 
dynamics [21,37]. Data-driven research on how workers are 
treated on the markets is missing. 
This paper complements and extends the existing 
understanding of crowd work earnings using a data-driven 
approach. Our research focuses on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (AMT), one of the largest micro-crowdsourcing 
markets, that is widely used by industry [34,48] and the 
HCI community, as well as by other research areas such as 
NLP and computer vision [15,45]. At the core of our 
research is an unprecedented amount of worker log data 
collected by the Crowd Workers Chrome plugin [14] 
between Sept 2014 to Jan 2017. Our dataset includes the 
records of 3.8 million HITs that were submitted or returned 
by 2,676 unique workers. The data includes task duration 
and HIT reward, which allows us to evaluate hourly wage 
rates—the key measure that has been missing from the prior 
data-driven research [21,40]—at an unprecedented scale. 
We provide the first task-level descriptive statistics on 
worker earnings. Our analysis reveals that the mean and 
median hourly wages of workers on AMT are $3.13/h and 
$1.77/h respectively. The hourly wage distribution has a 
long-tail; the majority of the workers earn low hourly 
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wages, but there are 111 workers (4%) who earned more 
than $7.25/h, the U.S. federal minimum wage. These 
findings reify existing research based on worker self-reports 
that estimate the typical hourly wage to be $1-6/h [4,34,49] 
and strongly supports the view that crowd workers on this 
platform are underpaid [34,38]. However, it is not that 
individual requesters are necessarily paying so little, as we 
found requesters pay $11.58/h on average. Rather, there is a 
group of requesters who post a large amount of low-reward 
HITs and, in addition, unpaid time spent doing work-related 
activities leads to the low wages. We quantify three sources 
of unpaid work that impact the hourly wage: (i) searching 
for tasks, (ii) working on tasks that are rejected, and (iii) 
working on tasks that are not submitted. If one ignores this 
unpaid work, our estimates of the median and mean hourly 
wages rise to $3.18/h and $6.19/h respectively. 
Our data also enable us to go beyond existing quantitative 
studies to examine how effective different work and task-
selection strategies are at raising hourly wages. Workers 
could employ the potential strategies to maximize their 
hourly wage while working on AMT. In the final section, 
we discuss the implications of our findings for initiatives 
and design opportunities to improve the working 
environment on AMT and crowdsourcing platforms in 
general.  
BACKGROUND 
Many are concerned that workers on crowdsourcing 
markets are treated unfairly [19,38,39,42,47,59]. Market 
design choices, it is argued, systematically favor requesters 
over workers in a number of dimensions. The use of 
asymmetric rating systems makes it difficult for workers to 
learn about unfair requesters [2,38,60], while platforms 
rarely offer protection against wage theft or provide 
mechanisms for workers to dispute task rejections and poor 
ratings [4,47].  Platforms’ characteristics such as pay-per-
work [2] and treating workers as contractors [64] (so 
requesters are not bound to paying minimum wage [64,66]) 
also contribute to earnings instability and stressful working 
conditions [4,11]. 
Past research has found evidence that workers typically 
earn a fraction of the U.S. minimum wage [34,35,37–39,49] 
and many workers report not being paid for adequately 
completed tasks [38,49,51]. This is problematic as income 
generation is the primary motivation of workers 
[4,13,46,49]. Further, low wage rates and the ethical 
concerns of workers should be of importance to requesters 
given the association between poor working conditions, low 
quality, and high turnover [12,27,44].  
To date, detailed research into crowd work earnings has 
been limited by an absence of adequate quantitative data. 
For instance, Martin et al. analyzed publicly available 
conversations on Turker Nation—a popular forum for 
workers—in an attempt to answer questions such as “how 
much do Turkers make?” [49]. While such analyses have 
provided important insights into how much the workers 
believe they earn, we cannot be sure if their earnings 
estimates are unbiased and representative. 
Existing quantitative work in crowdsourcing research has 
taken the employers’ perspective [49] (e.g., finding good 
pricing methods [36,50,61], suggesting effective task 
design for requesters [24,40]) or it focuses on 
characterizing the crowdsourcing market dynamics [21,37]. 
Although important, data-driven research on how workers 
are treated on the crowdsourcing markets is missing. This 
paper complements and extends our existing understanding 
of crowd work earnings using a data-driven approach. The 
unprecedented amount of AMT worker log data collected 
by the Crowd Workers Chrome plugin [14] allows us to 
evaluate hourly wage rates at scale. 
TERMINOLOGY 
Before presenting our formal analysis, we define a set of 
key terms necessary for understanding the AMT 
crowdsourcing platform. AMT was launched in 2008 and is 
one of the largest micro-task sites in operation today. The 
2010 report by Ipeirotis noted that the most prevalent types 
on AMT are transcription, data collection, image tagging, 
and classification [37]. Follow-up work by Difallah et al. 
reaffirms these findings, although tasks like audio 
transcription are becoming more prevalent [21]. 
Each standalone unit of work undertaken by a worker on 
AMT is referred to as a task or HIT. Tasks are listed on 
custom webpages nested within the AMT platform, 
although some tasks require workers to interact with web 
pages outside of the AMT platform.  
Tasks are issued by requesters. Requesters often issue 
multiple HITs at once that can be completed by different 
workers in parallel. A group of tasks that can be performed 
concurrently by workers is called a HIT group.  
Requesters can require workers to possess certain 
qualifications to perform their tasks. For example, a 
requester could only allow workers with “> 95% HIT 
approval rate” to work on their tasks.  
Workers who meet the required qualifications can accept 
HITs. Once workers complete a task, they submit their 
work for requesters to evaluate and either approve or reject 
the HITs. If a submitted task is approved, workers get a 
financial reward. If, however, a worker accepts a HIT but 
does not complete the task, the task is said to be returned. 
DATASET 
We describe the tool that we used to collect task-level data 
on worker behavior and present basic statistics of the data. 
Crowd Worker Plugin 
The data was collected using the Crowd Workers Chrome 
plugin [14]. The plugin was used by workers in an opt-in 
basis. The plugin was designed to disclose the effective 
hourly wage rates of tasks for workers, following design 
suggestions in [55]. It tracks what tasks and when workers 
accept and submit/return, as well as other metadata about 
the HITs. More specifically, our dataset includes:  
• User attributes such as worker IDs, registration date, 
blacklisted requesters, “favorite” requesters, and daily 
work time goal.   
• HIT Group information such as HIT Group IDs, titles, 
descriptions, keywords, reward, and requester IDs, and 
any qualification requirements. 
• For each HIT group, we have information on HIT IDs, 
submission status (i.e., submitted vs. returned), 
timestamps for HIT accept, submit, and return. 
• Web page domains that the workers visited (though the 
scope was limited to predefined domains including 
mturk.com, crowd-workers.com, and a selected few 
AMT-related sites (e.g., turkernation.com). 
• A partial record of HIT approval and rejection status for 
submitted HITs. The plugin periodically polled the 
worker’s AMT dashboard and scraped this data. As an 
approve/reject status is updated by the workers at their 
convenience rather than at a specified interval after task 
completion, we only have approval records for 29.6% of 
the HIT records.  
Some important attributes are not recorded in our dataset. 
For instance, the plugin does not record fine-grained 
interactions, such as keystrokes and mouse movements. 
Though potentially useful in, for example, detecting active 
work, we did not collect them because they could contain 
personally identifiable information. Further, while the 
plugin records data about browsing on a set of predefined 
web sites, it does not track browsing history on all domains. 
The plugin does not collect the HTML contents of the HIT 
UIs. Thus, we do not have the “true” answers for tasks that 
workers performed, so we cannot compute task accuracy. 
Data Description 
 
The dataset consists of task logs collected from Sept 2014 
to Jan 2017. There are 3,808,020 records of HITs from 
104,939 HIT groups performed by 2,676 unique workers. 
The recorded HITs were posted by 20,286 unique 
requesters. Figure 1 shows the transition in the number of 
active monthly users and tracked HITs. We can see that the 
number of recorded HITs increased from December 2015 
(N=114,129) and peaked on June 2016 (N=386,807). The 
data on January 2017 is small because the data was 
exported earlier in the month and the data for the full month 
was not collected. The number of unique monthly user 
started to increase from December 2015 (N=202), then 
peaked on November 2016 (N=842), indicating that the 
following analyses mainly reflect the activities from the end 
of 2015 to the end of 2016. To our knowledge, this is the 
largest AMT worker log data in existence that enables 
hourly wage analysis. 
 
On average, workers worked on 1,302 HITs each 
(SD=4722.5; median=128.5), spending 54.0 hours on 
average (SD=172.4; median=6.14h). Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of the total number of HITs completed by 
workers. One worker completed 107,432 HITs, whereas 
135 workers completed only one HIT. Workers used the 
Crowd Worker plugin for 69.6 days on average (SD=106.3; 
median=25 days). 
Some HITs were submitted with abnormally short or long 
work duration. This could be because these HITs were 
completed by automated scripts, submitted prematurely or 
workers abandoned/forgot to perform the tasks. To mitigate 
the effect of these outliers on our results, we filtered out top 
and bottom 5-percentile of the submitted HIT records based 
on their task duration, leaving N=3,471,580 HITs (91.2% of 
the original number). The remaining data represents 99,056 
unique HIT groups, N=2,666 unique workers, and 19,598 
unique requesters. 
We retain the N=23,268 (0.7%) HITs with $0 reward, 
which are typically qualification HITs (e.g., answering 
profile surveys). We keep these tasks in our dataset as time 
completing these tasks is still work even if it is not 
rewarded as such by the requesters. The small portion of the 
records does not significantly impact our results. 
THE AMT WAGE DISTRIBUTION 
In this section, we analyze the level and distribution of 
hourly wages and earnings on AMT. We first outline a set 
of methods to calculate hourly wages before reporting 
detailed descriptive statistics including total and hourly 
earnings.  
Measuring the Hourly Wage 
Work on AMT is organized and remunerated as a piece rate 
system in which workers are paid for successfully 
completed tasks. Our work log record includes Timesubmit, 
Timeaccept and the Reward for each HIT. If HIT 
Interval=Timesubmit - Timeaccept accurately reflected time 
spent working on a HIT, then it would be simple to 
calculate the hourly wage associated with each task as 
Reward / HIT Interval. (Note that when the worker returns 
the HIT, we use Reward=$0 regardless of the HIT reward.)  
Similarly, we could calculate the average per-worker hourly 
wage with ∑ 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 / ∑ 𝐻𝐼𝑇 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 –sum of the total 
 
Figure 1. Line charts showing the transition in the number of 
active monthly users and HIT records.   
 
Figure 2. Histogram of performed HIT counts by workers.  
reward over the total HIT duration that a person 
earned/spent over the course of working on HITs. We refer 
to this as the interval-based method of computing per-HIT 
and per-worker hourly wage. 
 
But the HIT Interval does not always correspond directly to 
work time. As depicted in Figure 3a, HIT Intervals can 
overlap when a worker accepts multiple HITs at once, and 
then completes them one-by-one. This is a common 
strategy that workers use to secure the HITs that they want 
to work on to prevent them from being taken by other 
workers. This could cause the interval-based method to 
underestimate the hourly wage because any time lag 
between accepting a HIT and starting to work on it will be 
counted as work time.  
There is also a question over how to treat the time between 
HITs when calculating the hourly wage. When a worker 
works on HITs in the same HIT group or looks for a new 
HIT using AMT’s search interface, there can be a lag 
between submitting one HIT and accepting the next. This 
seems important to count as part of working time but is not 
captured by the interval-based method, which could lead 
the interval-based method to overestimate the hourly wage.  
To take into account overlapping HITs and the time 
between tasks, we needed to temporally cluster the HITs 
into contiguous working sessions. We used a temporal 
clustering method following Monroe et al. [52] that groups 
a series of temporally close time intervals into clusters 
using an interval threshold, D. For example, given a pair of 
HITs that are sorted by Timeaccepted, the algorithm will group 
these HITs into a single cluster if the duration between the 
first HIT’s Timesubmitted timestamp and the second HIT’s 
Timeaccepted is smaller than D—see Figure 3b. Then, the 
cluster’s last Timesubmitted is compared with the subsequent 
HIT. If the duration between the next HIT’s Timeaccepted 
timestamp is smaller than gap D, the algorithm puts the HIT 
into this cluster. Otherwise, the subsequent HIT forms a 
new cluster. We call this the cluster-based method of 
measuring the hourly wage. 
Different choices of D yield different estimates of working 
time and thus hourly wages. With D=0, only concurrently 
occurring HITs are clustered together. We also report 
results for a choice of D>0. With D>0, HITs that are 
worked on sequentially but with slight intervals between 
submitting one task and accepting the next are clustered. 
Figure 4 shows how the number of clusters in the data set 
varies with D. The Elbow point is 1min [41]—the change in 
the number of clusters formed diminishes sharply after 
D=1min. This seems sensible as most intervals between 
submitting and accepting HITs within the same work 
session should be small. Thus, in addition to the interval-
based method, we report wage results using the cluster-
based method with D=0min and D=1min. We compute the 
per-cluster hourly wage for a cluster C as: 
𝑤𝐶 = ∑ 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑡𝑡∈𝐶 /(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡∈𝐶{𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡,𝑡} − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑡∈𝐶{𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡,𝑡})  (Eq. 1) 
where t refers to a task. The per-worker average hourly 
wage is then calculated as 𝑤 = ∑ 𝛿𝐶𝑤𝐶  where 𝛿𝐶  is the 
fraction of time spent on cluster C relative to all time spent 
working.  
 
Hourly Wages per HIT/Cluster 
We first report statistics on effective wage rates at the task 
level, calculated using our three different methods. In 
summary, depending on the measure used, mean wage rates 
per work-unit vary between $4.80/h and $6.19/h. 
N=600,763 (23.5%) of 0min clusters generated an hourly 
wage of $7.25, whereas N=80,427 (12.7%) of 1min clusters 
generated above the federal minimum wage. Table 1 gives 
the relevant summary statistics.  
 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of per-HIT/cluster hourly 
wages using the different methods for hourly wage 
computation, disregarding worker identity. The 
distributions are zero inflated, because N= 460,939 paid $0, 
either because they were qualification tasks and/or returned. 
After removing the $0 HITs, the median hourly wage using 
the interval-based method is $3.31/h and the mean hourly 
wage is $6.53/h (SD=25.8). We will revisit the impact of 
the returned HITs to the worker income later. 
 
Figure 3. Timeline visualization of HIT intervals and depiction 
of the temporal clustering method. The HIT interval data 
comes from one of the workers in our dataset. 
 
Figure 4. Line chart of the number of clusters formed. The 
change in the number becomes small after D=1min. 
 Per-HIT/Cluster ($/h) 
 Median Mean SD 
Interval 
(N=3,471,580) 
2.54 5.66 24.1 
Cluster (D=0; 
N=2,560,066) 
3.18 6.19 26.4 
Cluster (D=1; 
N=635,198) 
1.77 4.80 43.4 
Table 1. Summary of per-HIT/cluster hourly wage statistics. 
At D=0, N=2,560,066 clusters were formed. N=2,429,384 
had only 1 HIT in a cluster—i.e., 70% of HITs were not 
overlapping. Overlapping HITs came from N=1,629 
workers. This indicates that 38.9% of the workers never 
worked on HITs in parallel and 61.1% of the workers work 
on two or more HITs in parallel. Taking into account the 
overlapping nature of tasks raises estimates of average 
work-unit wage rates as shown in Figure 5a&b.  
At D=1, N=635,198 clusters were formed. The median and 
mean per-cluster hourly wages were $1.77/h and $4.80/h 
(SD=43.4) (Figure 5c). N=331,770 had only 1 HIT in a 
cluster. Compared to the statistics in case of D=0, the mean 
and median per-cluster hourly wages dropped by 1.39 and 
1.41. This indicates that the unpaid time intervals between 
accepting and submitting HITs have a non-negligible 
amount of impact to the hourly wage of the workers. 
 
Hourly Wages per Worker  
Average hourly wages per worker are lower than those at 
the task/cluster level. This is because small number of 
workers are contributing a large number of high hourly 
wage HITs. Depending on the method used, mean hourly 
wages per worker on AMT lie between $3.13/h and 
$3.48/h, while the median wage lies between $1.77/h and 
$2.11/h—see Table 2. Only 4.2% of workers earn more 
than the federal minimum wage on average. 
 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the per-worker hourly 
wage and Table 2 gives the relevant summary statistics. On 
average, the workers earned $95.96 (SD=310.56; 
median=$11.90). Compared to the interval-based per-
worker hourly wage, cluster based median wages are 19.2% 
(=2.11/1.77) and 12.4% (1.99/1.77) larger for D=0min and 
D=1min respectively. This indicates that the workers are 
benefiting from working in parallel, to some extent.  
The wage distributions are positively skewed, with a small 
proportion earning average wages in excess of $5/h. There 
are N=111 (4.2%) workers who are making more than 
minimum wage according to the interval-based method. 
The number of HITs performed by these workers ranged 
from 1 to 94,608 (median=12, mean=1512.8, SD=9586.8). 
Thus, we cannot attribute the high-hourly wage to 
experience on the platform alone, which does not explain 
the high hourly wage of more than half of the workers who 
completed N=12 tasks or less. To further investigate why 
these workers are earning more, we investigate the factors 
affecting low/high hourly wage in the next section. We use 
the interval-based method to compute hourly wage unless 
otherwise noted, because (i) the clustering methods for 
calculating wages does not provide granular task-level 
hourly wage information that is necessary in some of the 
analyses below and (ii) the interval-based method does not 
over/underestimate the wage much. 
 
FACTORS AFFECTING THE HOURLY WAGE  
In this section, we analyze the effect of (i) unpaid work, (ii) 
HIT reward, (iii) requester behaviors, (iv) qualifications, 
and (v) HIT type on the hourly wage to identify potential 
strategies for workers to increase their earnings.  
Unpaid Work 
It is not always obvious what counts as work on 
crowdsourcing platforms. Working on AMT often involves 
invisible work [62]—time spent on work that is 
directly/indirectly related to completing HITs yet unpaid. 
There are several types of this invisible work, including the 
time spent on the returned HITs, work done for the rejected 
HITs, and, again, time spent searching for HITs [26,49,51]. 
While these issues have been identified in prior work, their 
significance to hourly wage is not quantified. Below, we 
look into the impact of returned HITs, rejected HITs, and 
time between HITs on worker hourly wages. 
Returned HITs 
Of the 3.5m HITs, N=3,027,952 (87.2%) were submitted 
and N=443,628 (12.8%) were returned. For the submitted 
HITs, the median and mean work durations were 41s and 
116.8s (SD=176.4s). For the returned HITs, the median and 
mean time spent were 28.4s and 371.5s (SD=2909.8). The 
total work duration of submitted and returned HITs was 
143,981 hours. 98,202 hours were spent on the submitted 
HITs and 45,778 hours were spent on the returned HITs.  
We cannot quantify exactly how much monetary value has 
been lost due to the 12.8% of the work that was never 
compensated. However, if we assume that the workers 
could have earned $1.77/h or $7.25/h—the interval-based 
 
Figure 5. Distributions of per-HIT and per-cluster hourly 
wages. The blue and green lines indicate median and mean. 
 Per-Worker ($/h) 
 Median Mean SD 
Interval 1.77 3.13 25.5 
Cluster (D=0) 2.11 3.48 25.1 
Cluster (D=1) 1.99 3.32 25.0 
Table 2. Summary of per-worker hourly wage statistics. 
 
Figure 6. Distributions of per-worker hourly wages based on 
the interval-based and cluster-based methods. The blue and 
green lines indicate median and mean. 
hourly wage and the U.S. minimum wage—$81,027 (1.77 x 
45,778) or $331,890 (7.25 x 45,778) was unpaid.  
On average, each worker in our dataset returned 26.5% of 
HITs and spent 17.2 hours on average (SD=71.7, 
Median=0.9 hours) on them. Evaluating these tasks at the 
hourly wage ($1.77/h) suggests that workers wasted $30.44 
worth of time on average. This shows that returning HITs 
introduce a significant amount of monetary loss. 
In our dataset we cannot observe why a worker returns a 
HIT. So investigating why HITs are returned should thus be 
a key area of future research; it could be because of poor 
task instructions that prohibits workers from completing a 
HIT, broken interface that prohibits submitting HITs, a 
worker not enjoying a task, and others. 
Rejected HITs 
In our dataset, N=1,029,162 out of 3.5m HITs (29.6%) had 
‘approved’ or ‘rejected’ status. Within these records, 
N=1,022,856 records (99.4%) were approved and N=6,306 
(0.6%) were rejected. In terms of total time spent on the 
approved and rejected HITs, 33,130 hours were spent on 
the approved HITs (99.3%) and 240 hours were spent on 
the rejected HITs (0.7%).  
This suggests that, at least within the scope of our data, HIT 
rejection is a smaller issue in terms of unpaid work as 
nearly 100% of work was accepted. Note, however, as 
McInnis revealed [51], workers are sensitive to rejection 
because a poor approval rate could prohibit them from 
doing some tasks on the market (because some HITs 
require a high approval rate) or get them banned 
permanently from the platform. Avoiding rejection (e.g., by 
returning) could be contributing to the high acceptance rate. 
Time between HITs 
Our cluster-based analysis of the worker hourly wage 
suggests that there is non-negligible amount of unpaid time 
spent between HITs. Some portion of this likely represents 
time taken for searching for HITs, waiting for a page to 
load or accepting new HITs, although we have no way to 
know how workers are spending their time between HITs. 
We now investigate the effect of the unpaid time between 
HITs on the worker hourly wage. We do this by computing 
the total cluster-based task durations with D=1min and 
D=0min, and subtracting the former by the latter. 
In total, workers spent 103,030 hours working according to 
the D=1min cluster-based total duration and 98,427 hours 
working based on the D=0min cluster based duration. This 
implies that 4602.7 hours were spent between HITs. Time 
spent between HITs sums up to 103.6 minutes on per-
worker average. Median total time between HITs per 
worker was 12.1 minutes. Naturally, people who worked on 
more HITs had larger unpaid time between HITs. Using the 
median hourly wage ($1.77/h) and the US federal minimum 
wage ($7.25), the monetary values of the total unpaid time 
amounts to $8,146.78 and $33,369.58. 
Takeaway 
Returning HITs has the biggest impact to the hourly wage. 
The time lost due to the time between the HITs has the 
second most impact. Task rejection has the least impact in 
terms of unpaid work. Note, however, rejection could have 
potential risks of not being able to accept HITs in the future 
or getting banned from AMT, which is not quantified here. 
HIT Reward 
The hourly wage depends both on HIT reward and how 
long it takes to complete a task. While it might seem 
obvious that higher reward HITs result in higher hourly 
wages, this relationship might not hold if higher paying 
HITs take proportionately longer to complete. 
To investigate the relationship between HIT reward and 
hourly wages, we examine the association between the 
mean interval-based HIT hourly wage of HIT groups and 
HIT reward. Similar to the per-worker hourly wage, mean 
per-group hourly wage is ∑ 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 / ∑ 𝐻𝐼𝑇 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 , 
summed over the tasks in the same HIT group. In the 
analysis of this section, we omit the HITs that had $0 
reward to remove the effect of returned HITs. 
As the HIT reward distribution is highly skewed, we apply 
the Box-Cox transformation 1  (λ=0.174) for our analysis. 
We select this transformation over alternatives as it 
generated better fit for the regression model that we 
describe in the next paragraph. We transform the per-HIT 
group hourly wage using the log transformation.  
 
We fit the transformed reward and hourly wage using 
ordinary least squares regression. The residuals are slightly 
skewed and peaked compared to the normal distribution 
assumed by the model (skew=0.7, kurtosis=2.2), but it 
should be tolerable. We obtain 𝑦 = 1.996𝑥 + 0.9465 
(R2=0.18; Figure 7). The obtained linear model is for the 
transformed data. In the original dimension, this model 
suggests that if a worker completes a HIT with $0.01 
reward, they should expect to earn $2.06/h. Similarly, 
working on a HIT with $1.00 reward should yield $8.84/h 
                                                           
1 Box-Cox transform is given by 𝑦 =
𝑥𝜆−1
𝜆
 [20] 
 
Figure 7. The scatter plot showing the relationship between 
the transformed reward and hourly wage. The line represents 
the model that we fit with ordinary linear regression.  
and working on HITs with rewards above $0.64 should pay 
workers above the minimum wage ($7.25/h). 
We point out that there are low-reward HITs that yield 
high-hourly wage, too. This means some low reward HITs 
are indeed priced fairly in terms of the time that a worker 
has to spend to complete them. It is, however, harder for 
workers to distinguish low-reward HITs that yield high 
hourly wage and low hourly wage a priori. 
Takeaway 
High reward HITs yield a higher hourly wage, indicating 
that while they take longer to perform, they do not take so 
much longer as to eliminate the gains of the higher piece 
rate. The analysis suggests an easy-to-employ strategy for 
worker to increase their wages (i.e., take high reward 
HITs). 
Requesters 
Workers seek to find good requesters so they can earn fairer 
rewards [49,51]. To do so they use tools such as 
Turkopticon [38] and information from sites like Turker 
Nation [67]. In this section, we evaluate how much 
variation in hourly wages there is across requesters. 
We use the interval-based method to compute the per HIT 
hourly wage—or hourly payment from the requester’s 
perspective—and in turn per-requester hourly payment. The 
other methods for calculating wages do not make sense for 
this analysis because tasks grouped together may come 
from different requesters. Overall, there were N=19,598 
requesters who posted at least 1 HIT in our dataset. On 
average, requesters posted N=173.4 HITs (SD=4283.0), 
with the median N=6 HITs. To investigate the 
characteristics of actual payments, we removed the HITs 
that were returned. This reduces the HITs to 3.03 million 
records from N=16,721 requesters (i.e., HITs in our records 
from 2,839 requesters were never completed). We also filter 
out qualification HITs that had $0 reward. Per-HIT level 
hourly payment follows the same trend as what we saw in 
the analyses of interval-based hourly wage, so we skip that 
analyses and only report the per-requester statistics.
 
Using the filtered data, we computed the hourly payment 
per requester. On average, requesters paid $11.58/h 
(SD=145.71; median=$4.57/h)—see Figure 8. Mean and 
median are higher than per-worker hourly wage statistics 
(e.g., interval-based mean and median wages are $3.13/h 
and $1.77/h). This suggests that the large sum of low-paid 
HITs is posted by a relatively small number of requesters. 
 
The aggregate statistics disregard the number of HITs the 
requester posted. For example, 3,667 requesters posted only 
1 HIT, whereas 1 requester posted 405,709 HITs. 
Therefore, we created a scatter plot that depicts the 
relationship between per-requester hourly payment and how 
many HITs the requesters posted (Figure 9).  
In Figure 9, each dot represents a requester. The x-axis is 
the number of HITs posted by each requester, while the y-
axis represents per-requester hourly payment. The dashed 
line indicates 7.25/h. The green points above the dashed 
line indicate the requesters who paid more than minimum 
wage (N=4,473). N=962 of them posted more than 10 HITs 
and N=3,511 posted less than 10 HITs. While many 
requesters post a large amount of low-payment HITs, there 
are requesters who are posting above median number of 
HITs that yield fair wage. This validates that it is feasible to 
get fair hourly wage if you can find good requesters.
 
Do requesters who post high-reward HITs pay more fairly? 
To validate this, we look into the relationship between the 
per-requester HIT reward and hourly payment. Figure 10 
shows the median HIT reward per-requester on the x-axis 
and the hourly payment on the y-axis. The graph indicates 
that working for requesters who constantly post high reward 
HITs is associated with earning a higher hourly wage. This 
corresponds to the insight from the previous analysis that 
working on high reward HITs can be lucrative.  
Takeaway 
Though the majority of the requesters pay below minimum 
wage, we saw that there are requesters who are fair. They 
post a significant number of HITs. Thus, finding these 
requesters and giving their work priority could improve 
worker hourly wage. Existing worker tools could support 
this by watching for the presence of HITs from these 
requesters and alerting workers to their presence [68]. 
 
Figure 8. KDE plot of per-requester hourly payment. 
 
Figure 9. A scatter plot of per-requester HIT count vs. per-
requester hourly payment. 
 
Figure 10. A scatter plot of median HIT reward paid by 
requesters vs. per-requester hourly payment. 
Qualifications 
Qualifications allow requesters to selectively hire workers. 
As this gives requesters the potential to hire only skilled 
and/or targeted workers, it is plausible that HITs that 
require qualification pay more generously. We thus 
compare the wage of HITs with and without qualification 
requirements. 
Our dataset contains N=1,801 unique qualification types. 
N=36,068 unique HIT groups requires at least one 
qualification, which corresponds to N=1,711,473 HITs. 
N=1,760,107 HITs did not require qualifications. The 
median interval-based hourly wage of the HITs with and 
without qualification requirements were $2.63/h and 
$2.45/h respectively. Likewise, means were $5.65/h 
(SD=19.1) and $5.67/h (SD=28.2). Unlike what we 
expected, the wages did not differ much between groups. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the ten most common qualification 
types. For example, N=1,309,320 HITs required the 
workers to have “HIT approval rate (%)” qualification, 
N=937,701 HITs required the workers to have “Location” 
qualification, and so on. Some qualifications seem to 
correspond to higher hourly wage. Figure 11 shows that 7 
out the ten most common qualifications such as “Total 
approved HITs” and “Question Editor” corresponded to 
higher hourly wage compared to the overall average wage. 
 
Takeaway 
The HITs that require qualifications do not necessarily yield 
a higher hourly wage. But there are some qualifications that 
correspond to higher hourly wage (e.g., “Question Editor”). 
Types of Work 
What types or topics of HITs yield high hourly wage? 
Knowing that could guide workers to selectively work on 
types of work associated with high-wage. Unfortunately, 
the platform does not provide adequate information about a 
topic of a particular HIT. While requesters could provide 
HIT keywords, they are not necessarily consistent across 
HITs and keywords could be ambiguous. In fact, in our 
pilot analysis where we studied the relationship between 
keyword and hourly wage, keyword ambiguity prevented us 
from understanding what topic/keyword of HITs yield high 
hourly wage (e.g., audio and image ‘transcription’ gets 
mixed up). Thus keywords alone were not adequate to 
characterize HIT types, which led us to also take 
information from HITs’ titles and descriptions.  
Manually labeling HITs’ topics based on HIT title, 
description, and keywords—we call this triplet a HIT 
document—cannot be done by any one person because of 
the data volume. We thus turn to a labeling process 
mediated by computation known as topic modeling. Topic 
modeling methods are often used to categorize a set of 
unlabeled documents into a finite number of coherent topic 
clusters [7,28,63], in turn helping researchers to navigate a 
large corpus (HIT documents in our case) [17,18,24,54]. 
However, unsupervised clustering of unlabeled documents 
is far from a solved problem [16,18]. Although there are 
existing machine learning algorithms like K-Means [32] 
and Latent Dirichlet Allocation [7], fully automated 
algorithm still cannot cluster documents with adequate 
accuracy.  
The lack of a go-to method for document clustering 
necessitates us to iteratively explore different methods that 
allow us to efficiently and effectively categorize HIT 
documents into a set of topics. After trial-and-errors, we 
settled in using a three-step method, which involved:  
(i) transform each HIT document into vector representation 
using term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) 
and Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) transformations; (ii) 
retrieve a list of topical keywords by a semi-automated 
process that involves automated clustering of the 
transformed HIT documents and manual process of 
retrieving recurring topical phrases; and (iii) we use the 
retrieved topical keywords to query HITs in our dataset.  
Vector Representation of HIT Description 
The starting point of the process is preprocessing of HIT 
descriptions. From each HIT group, we extract requester-
specified title, description, and keywords, then concatenate 
them into a single document. To suppress the effect of 
uninformative words to the subsequent steps, we remove 
stop words (e.g., “the”), remove special characters (e.g., 
“*”), turn them into lower-case, and remove the last 
character of a term if it ends with “s”. 
We then create a table of term counts in which rows 
represent documents, columns represent terms in of the 
documents, and each cell contains the count of words used 
Qualification Name HIT 
Count 
Median 
($/h) 
Mean 
($/h) 
SD 
HIT approval rate 
(%) 
1309320 2.30 5.55 17.16 
Location 937701 3.10 6.13 19.89 
Total approved HITs 647831 4.14 7.80 19.27 
Adult Content 
Qualification 
410193 4.25 6.05 7.76 
Category Validation  207581 3.81 4.99 4.57 
Blocked 145782 4.19 5.44 4.90 
HIT abandonment 
rate (%) 
83145 2.47 4.89 7.09 
Global Quality Score 67332 2.40 4.31 5.71 
M st rs 37067 4.03 6.23 10.96 
Question Editor 34465 5.65 5.77 3.35 
Table 3. T p ten most prev lent qualification types. 
 
Figure 11. Mean and median hourly wages yielded by the 
HITs that require the ten most common qualification types. 
in a HIT document. At this point, there is no distinction 
between the words’ importance (e.g., terms “survey” and 
“good” have same weight even though the former is likely 
more informative for characterizing a HIT topic). A 
common step for assigning importance to words is TF-IDF 
transformation [56]. The method assigns a weight to a term 
that occurs frequently in a document, but negatively 
weights the term that appears across documents. 
A tabulation with term counting and TF-IDF transformation 
yields a sparse, high-dimensional matrix. This causes the 
poorly generalizable representation and negatively impacts 
the subsequent clustering and querying steps. We thus use 
Latent Semantic Analysis which maps a sparse vector 
representation of a document into denser latent vectors [58]. 
Following the advice by Evangelopoulos et al [23], we map 
the rows of HIT documents into kdim=300 dimensions. 
Retrieving HIT Topics 
Given the latent representation of the documents (i.e., HIT 
group descriptions), we move on to retrieving the topical 
keywords. This sub-process includes two steps: (i) K-
Means based automated document clustering and (ii) 
manual retrieval of topical phrases from the clustered 
documents. 
We use K-Means algorithm to cluster the transformed 
documents that are close to each other in the latent space 
[53]. K-Means clustering requires a user to specify a 
distance function and a number of clusters a priori. We use 
cosine distance to measure the similarity between two 
documents. Cosine distance returns a value between [0, 2], 
where 0 indicates that two documents are close or similar. 
We follow Bradford recommendation and use a clusters 
size  
kcluster=200 [9].  
From each of the formed HIT document 200 clusters, we 
sampled 50 HIT groups uniformly randomly. We manually 
go through them and retrieve recurring topical keywords 
(e.g., {“transcribe”, “image”}). While 200x50=10k is a 
large number, this way of retrieving topical phrases is easier 
compared to randomly going through all 99k HIT groups 
because clustering algorithm returns some sets of HIT 
documents with clean, coherent topics. The retrieved 
topical keywords are listed on Table 4, which we further 
group into classes of HIT taxonomy given by Gadiraju et 
al. [25] (with an additional category Research). 
Querying HITs 
Given the document-to-vector mapping and the list of 
topical keywords, we can move on to querying HITs from 
the dataset. Using the same transformation that is used to 
map a HIT document to a latent vector, we map every 
topical keyword (e.g., {“psychology”, “survey”}, {“audio”, 
“transcription}) into a vector of real values. This allows us 
to use cosine distance to measure similarity between a 
topical phrase, which acts as a search query and documents. 
While there is no universally accepted distance threshold 
for the cosine distance, dcosine=0.4 is considered as a good 
choice [23], which we follow. Although Evangelopoulos et 
al. warns that this threshold is solely based on heuristics, 
manual inspection of query results validated that relevant 
documents are returned. 
Query Result 
Figure 12a shows the distributions of hourly wage for the 
seven HIT categories. Duplicate HITs that are associated 
with two or more topical phrases are dropped for aggregate 
statistic computation and plotting the distribution. For each 
of Information Finding (IF), Verification and Validation 
(VV), Interpretation and Analysis (IA), Content Creation 
(CC), Surveys, Content Access (CA), and Research, tuples 
of (class, mean wage, median wage) are: (IF, 8.43, 3.78), 
(VV, 6.78, 3.60), (IA, 11.36, 8.94), (CC, 2.13, 1.26), 
(Surveys, 9.30, 4.88), (CA, 7.59 , 5.99), and (Research, 
7.63, 5.40). CC’s hourly wage distribution is highly skewed 
toward low-wage. IF, VV, and Survey HITs’ wages are 
skewed toward low-wage too, but less so compared to the 
CC’s distribution. Interpretation and Analysis (IA), Content 
Access (CA), and Research are more flatly distributed, 
showing HITs of these topics tend to yield higher wage. 
Figure 12b shows strip plots where each circle represents a 
topical query. The size of circles corresponds to the number 
of HITs retrieved. The x-axis represents the median HIT 
hourly wage among the retrieved HITs. We observe two 
HIT groups with large quantities of tasks under CC are 
pulling down the hourly wage distribution. They correspond 
to topical keywords {“transcribe”, “data”} (N=313,559; 
median=$1.24/h) and {“transcribe”, “image”} (N=152,031; 
Information Finding (IF; N=26,203) 
data collection; data extraction; find company name; find contact; 
find email; find phone number; find url; find website 
Verification and Validation (VV; N=13,081) 
audio quality assurance; detect spam; verify image; website test 
Interpretation and Analysis (IA; N=72,932) 
brand evaluation; evaluate brand; image categorization; rate 
article; rating image; rating picture; rating product; review article; 
review video; video evaluation; web page categorization 
Content Creation (CC; N=320,220) 
audio transcription; describe image; describe video; logo design; 
photo tagging; transcribe audio; transcribe data; transcribe data; 
transcribe image; transcribe text; translation 
Surveys (N=47,192; the term ‘survey’ is omitted from each 
phrase for brevity) 
academic; activitie; advertising; attitude; behavior; behavioral; 
belief; brand; college student; consumer behavior; consumer 
choice; consumer experience; consumer preference; consumer; 
consumer topic; current event; decision making; decision; 
demographic; everyday life; game; habit; health; life event; life 
experience; life; marketing; mental health; opinion; personal; 
personality; policy; politic; political attitude; preference; product 
evaluation; product; psychological; psychology; public opinion; 
public policy; relationship; research; scenario; search result; 
shopping; smartphone app; social attitude; social experience; social 
media; social psychology; technology; workplace 
Content Access (CA; N=995) 
content viewing; image viewing 
Research (N=433) 
economic experiment; market research study; psychology
experiment 
Table 4. The full list of topical phras  colle ted th ough  
HIT topic retrieval process. 
median=1.13/h). On the other hand, topical phrase 
{“video”, “evaluation”} under the category IA is associated 
with higher median hourly wage ($10.30/h) and has large 
quantity (N=49,720), making the group’s distribution flat. 
Takeaway 
There is variation in hourly wage between different topics 
of HITs. We showed that HITs such as data/image 
transcription are low-paying whereas “video evaluation” 
HITs are high-paying.  
DISCUSSION 
We estimate that 96% of workers on AMT earn below the 
U.S federal minimum wage. While requesters are paying 
$11.58/h on average, dominant requesters who post many 
low-wage HITs like content creation tasks are pulling down 
the overall wage distribution. This is problematic as the 
primary goal of workers is income generation [4,13,46,49], 
rather than having fun or making pocket money [2,4,43]. 
Many people working on low paying HITs are likely from 
groups traditionally excluded from the formal labor market 
[1,4,10,64], such as people with disabilities who have 
challenges in securing jobs at contemporary office work 
environment [4,65]. Hara and Bigham noted that some 
crowd work like image transcription can be done by autistic 
people—a population that has challenge in securing jobs 
compared to those without disabilities [10,30,33]—but this 
type of work is exactly what generates the lowest hourly 
wages as we showed in the topical analysis. We here 
discuss the implications of our results for the design of 
worker tools and platform infrastructure, and call on the 
HCI community to advance research in tools that can help 
to achieve a fairer distribution of earnings from crowd 
work. 
Raising workers’ awareness of their effective hourly wage 
and suggesting real-time strategies to increase their 
earnings may help workers to optimize their task selection 
and working patterns. Providing visualized, easy to 
interpret information about earnings provides useful 
feedback for workers that is not provided by AMT. 
Although measuring hourly wage is not straightforward [3], 
we showed that different wage computation methods do not 
result in largely different hourly wage estimates. Privacy 
concerns must be taken into consideration when designing 
such tools. Although the Crowd Worker plugin does not 
collect more information than it requires to compute hourly 
wages, this may not be visible to workers which could limit 
adoption of the technology [57]. 
Unpaid work is an important factor driving low hourly 
wages on AMT. Workers are not paid when searching for 
tasks and are not paid for qualification tasks nor tasks that 
are returned or rejected. We suspect that experienced 
workers learn over time to minimize such unpaid work. 
However, encoding this process into a system that can be 
used by novice workers maximize their wage would be 
beneficial. Tools that automatically push tasks to workers 
(e.g., [29,30]) and inform them of how likely the task is to 
be completable and accepted, combined with real-time 
information about tasks that exist on the market could thus 
be useful. 
The majority of requesters pay below minimum wage. 
Helping workers to avoid unfair requesters is one way of 
dealing with this problem. But fair requesters do not post 
HITs all the time and a solution to the root problem—the 
presence of unfair requesters—is needed. We may be able 
to mitigate the problem by facilitating the communication 
between workers and/or increasing minimum reward.  
Workers cite poor communication with requesters as a 
major flaw in crowd work platform design [4]. Improving 
communication channels might make it easier for requesters 
to identify and fix broken HITs (reducing time spent on 
returned tasks) and enable crowd workers to bargain 
collectively. While nudging workers to individually or 
collectively communicate and negotiate is difficult [42,59], 
overcoming these barriers can be beneficial for workers. 
LIMITATIONS 
Our results may be biased (e.g., super turkers [8] who are 
already experienced may not be interested in using the 
plugin). That said, our sample includes 2,676 workers, each 
of whom completed 1.3k tasks on average. Our estimate of 
work intervals may not correspond to the time spent 
actively working on HITs, but this is same for any time-
based payment scheme. Our data did not capture what 
scripts workers may have been using to assist them. Those 
who use scripts may have been automating some parts of 
 
Figure 12. (a) Hourly wage distributions of seven HIT categories provided by Gadiraju et al. [25] (with an additional category 
Research). (b) Strip plots showing median hourly wages of HITs associated with the topical keywords in Table 4. 
their work and earning more than those who do not. While 
our analyses suggested methods for increasing wage, we do 
not argue for causal relationship. Like many log analysis, 
we lack worker demographics. To better understand who 
are the workers in our dataset, we will conduct an online 
survey study. Investigation of other ethical issues like over-
time work is future work. 
CONCLUSION 
We used the log data of 2,676 workers performing 3.8 
million tasks on Amazon Mechanical Turk to understand 
worker hourly wages. Our task-level analysis revealed a 
median hourly wage of ~$2/h, validating past self-report 
estimates. Only 4% of workers earn more than $7.25/h, 
justifying concerns about non-payment of the minimum 
wage. We characterize three sources of unpaid work that 
impact the hourly wage (i.e., task search, task rejection, task 
return). We further explore the characteristics of tasks and 
working patterns that yield higher hourly wages. 
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